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Abstract  
We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate 
them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a 
significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new 
stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation 
structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive 
the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover 
performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total 
compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers 
separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associ-
ated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in op-
erating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the in-
coming relative to the outgoing CEO. 
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1   Introduction 
A primary mechanism for controlling conflicts of interest between managers and 
shareholders is the ability of the board of directors to effect management changes. 1 In 
addition, executive turnover provides an opportunity for boards of directors to mod-
ify the structure of compensation. If boards are effective in their selection of incoming 
CEOs and provide appropriate incentive compensation, then we should see improve-
ment in operating performance following CEO turnover. The purpose of this paper 
is to examine the compensation packages of newly appointed CEOs to identify com-
pensation components associated with future firm performance and also to identify 
changes in compensation that are associated with improved performance after CEO 
turnover. We also compare the compensation structure of the outgoing CEO to that of 
the incoming CEO around forced and voluntary CEO turnover. 
The related compensation literature is extensive (e.g., Murphy 1999). First, a sub-
stantial amount of literature focuses on the sensitivity of compensation to firm perfor-
mance (e.g., Murphy 1985; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Crawford et al. 1995). In general, 
these studies find a significantly positive relation between compensation and perfor-
mance. Compensation research also focuses on compensation structure as a function 
of certain firm characteristics. Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) 
find that growth firms pay significantly higher levels of cash compensation to their 
executives and have a significantly higher incidence of stock option plans than non-
growth firms. 
Additional research relates firm performance to compensation structure and to 
changes in firm performance surrounding executive turnover. For example, Meh-
ran (1995) finds a positive relation between firm performance and the percentage of a 
manager’s compensation that is equity based. Studying CEO turnovers from 1985 to 
1988, Denis and Denis (1995) find that industry-adjusted operating income increases 
significantly in the years following CEO replacement. They find significant differences 
in this effect, however, between samples of forced resignations and normal retire-
ments. The forced resignations are characterized by significant improvements in op-
erating income following turnover whereas the sample of normal retirements exhibits 
only small post-turnover improvements in operating income. Huson et al. (2004) also 
find that post turnover performance improvements tend to be in those firms that hire 
CEOs from outside the firm. 
Our paper complements these earlier works on executive compensation and firm 
performance by examining the changes in compensation structure around turnover 
within the same firm thereby implicitly controlling for firm-specific characteristics 
and further relating compensation structure to future firm performance. When ana-
lyzing the relation between managerial equity ownership and firm performance, Core 
and Larcker (2002) assume that firms choose optimal managerial equity incentives 
when they contract but transaction costs prohibit continuous re-contracting. Drawing 
1 Several studies examine the poor performance hypothesis, which states that effective corporate 
boards replace CEOs when firm performance is poor. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. 
(1988), Weisbach (1988), and Blackwell et al. (1994) find that the probability of a CEO change is in-
versely related to the firm’s performance. 
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on Core and Larcker’s assumption, we argue that boards are likely to move to optimal 
executive compensation designs when they contract with the incoming CEO. Turn-
over is a time when a board is required to contract with the incoming CEO and the 
transaction cost associated with the contracting is unavoidable. 
We begin by examining changes in the structure of CEO compensation surround-
ing 125 turnovers that occur from 1982 to 1991. Overall, we find that, compared to 
outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their to-
tal compensation from new stock options granted and new stock grants. Total equity-
based incentive compensation as a percentage of total compensation is significantly 
greater for incoming CEOs relative to the outgoing CEOs. 2 These results tend to hold 
even when differentiating between voluntary and forced turnover or when control-
ling for the age of the incoming and outgoing CEO. Thus, firms appear to load up in-
coming CEOs with new option and stock grants in an attempt to increase total equity-
based compensation for the incoming CEO. 
Next we analyze the association between post turnover performance and compen-
sation structure. Our results suggest that new stock grants as a percentage of total 
compensation are positively related to future performance. The positive relation be-
tween new stock grants and future performance is documented in both the full sam-
ple and the voluntary and forced turnover subsamples. We also find a positive re-
lation between option grants and future operating income for the forced turnover 
subsample. Analyzing changes in compensation structure, we also document evi-
dence that increases in new stock grants are associated with improved operating in-
come after turnover. In general, these results suggest that firm performance improve-
ments following CEO turnover are associated with greater CEO stock grants. 
Much of the focus in new CEO compensation contracts is on options which may 
result from their favorable accounting treatment during our sample period. Our re-
sults suggest that restricted stock grants align the interests of managers and share-
holders more effectively than stock options. Our evidence appears consistent with re-
cent anecdotal evidence provided by Microsoft, when it announced that it would no 
longer issue stock options but will make employees eligible to receive awards of re-
stricted shares that vest over 5 years (see Guth and Lublin 2003, p. A1). 
In the next section of the paper, we describe the sample and the data. In Section 3 
we analyze changes in compensation structure around turnover. Section 4 provides a 
discussion of results associated with changes in CEO compensation and future per-
formance. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2   The sample and data 
2.1   The sample 
We choose a sample of firms that experience turnover prior to the implementation 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993 which took effect on January 
2 We also analyze total stockholdings in place of new stock grants since total stockholdings pro-
vide incentives although they are not part of the current compensation package. When we measure 
the percentages of total compensation based on salary and bonus, total stockholdings and option 
grants our results differ. Total CEO stockholdings are significantly higher for the outgoing CEO 
relative to the incoming CEO. Option grants remain significantly greater for the incoming CEO rel-
ative to the outgoing CEO but total incentives become significantly lower for the incoming CEO 
relative to the outgoing CEO. 
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1, 1994. The legislation capped the corporate tax deductibility of top management com-
pensation at $1 million per executive unless it qualified as substantially performance 
based. Since the legislation exempted qualified performance based compensation, some 
argued that firms would modify the structure of executive compensation plans (see 
Rose and Wolfram (2002); Perry and Zenner (2001) for a more thorough discussion of 
the regulation). The evidence, however, is mixed on the effect of the legislation on com-
pensation. Perry and Zenner (2001), for example, find evidence consistent with the Act 
increasing the pay–performance sensitivity of executive compensation for firms affected 
by the legislation. Alternatively, Rose and Wolfram (2002) find little evidence that the 
deductibility cap had a significant effect on overall executive compensation levels or 
growth rates at firms likely affected by the legislation. We avoid the potential problems 
associated with a shift in compensation structure after the implementation of OBRA of 
1993 by choosing a sample of firms with CEO turnover prior to 1993 and measuring our 
compensation variables prior to the implementation of the Act. 
The initial sample is derived from 1,431 firms that have appeared in the Forbes An-
nual Survey of Compensation (hereafter, Forbes) in the 12 years, 1981–1992. 3 We elimi-
nate from the sample 182 firms that experienced no turnover during 1981–1992 and 
another 368 that experienced no turnover but left the sample because of merger, ac-
quisition, liquidation, bankruptcy, and other restructuring. Next we eliminate 294 
regulated financial services firms (SIC 6021-6799) and public utilities (SIC 4911-4932). 
4 To avoid including interim CEOs in the sample, we require 2 years of data for the 
same CEO, eliminating 114 firms. Due to missing proxy statements or incomplete 
firm performance data on the Compustat Industrial or Full Coverage files, we lose 254 
firms. Of the 219 firms experiencing 249 CEO turnovers during the sample period, we 
eliminate an additional 58 turnovers because we were unable to determine the reason 
for the turnover. We exclude additional observations because of incomplete compen-
sation data. Therefore, the samples we analyze range from 100 to 121 turnovers, de-
pending on the specific analysis performed. 
2.2   Identifying CEO turnover 
To identify turnover, we record the name of each firm’s CEO for each year in 
the Forbes survey. For firms entering the survey after 1981 or leaving the survey be-
fore 1992, we obtain the CEO name from proxy statements for all subsequent or 
prior years. We use the firm’s proxies and Forbes to gather information regarding the 
CEO’s age, tenure with the firm, and tenure as CEO. The transition year is the fiscal 
year of the turnover. 
3 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) note that sample selections based on the Forbes 500 may bias a sam-
ple toward large, surviving, and growing firms. In an attempt to address this bias, we allow firms to 
enter or exit the panel over time. In addition, arguably we could choose a sample of turnovers after 
the passage of OBRA of 1993 to avoid the possibility of firms adjusting compensation structure due 
to the legislation. We did not choose this sample period since it would reduce the time horizon avail-
able for turnover. Since we require compensation data 1 year after turnover and firm performance 
data 2 and 3 years after turnover, our turnover sample period would be much shorter (1994–1999) 
and still may capture the effect of the legislation as more firms approach the $1 million salary cap. 
4 We define regulated industries similarly to Fama and French (1986) and DeFusco et al. (1991). We 
analyze only industrial firms to economize on data collection costs without unduly limiting the gen-
eralizability of our results. Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) argue that regulated 
firms have systematically different compensation schemes because regulation restricts the invest-
ment opportunity set. 
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2.3   Classifying forced and voluntary CEO turnover 
Our scheme for classifying turnovers as forced or voluntary is based on that of 
Gilson (1989), Weisbach (1988), and Parrino (1997) and incorporates elements of each. 
We classify as forced turnovers all CEO changes other than those arising from retire-
ment, normal management succession, death, illness, or those involving the CEO’s 
departure for a prestigious position elsewhere. We initially assume a voluntary retire-
ment for any departing CEO at least 64 years old unless we later uncover information 
suggesting the departure is performance-related. 
We consult the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI), or both 
for turnover reasons. First, we checked the WSJI, which in some cases provides an un-
ambiguous reason for the CEO’s departure. If, however, the WSJI-reason is unclear or 
if no reason is mentioned, we consult the full WSJ article. We also consult the full ar-
ticle for reported retirements, resignations, or normal management successions to de-
termine whether these reasons are associated with poor firm performance. We read 
the full WSJ article for 85% of the turnover sample. Voluntary turnovers account for 
92 (76%) of the turnovers in the sample. Twenty-nine (24%) turnovers are forced. 5 
2.4   Compensation and firm level data 
From corporate proxy statements we gather information on salary, bonus, exec-
utive stock option grants, and CEO stock holdings. We collect data for the 4 years 
surrounding the turnover: 1 year before the transition year, the transition year, and 
2 years after the transition year. We require complete data for all compensation vari-
ables in order for the turnover observation to remain in the final sample. We adjust all 
compensation data for inflation, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to convert the 
values to 1986 dollars. 
Because proxy statements during our sample period frequently aggregate salary 
and bonus under the heading total cash compensation, we report the combined salary 
and bonus figures. We value stock options granted using the Black-Scholes model un-
der a set of assumptions similar to those of Murphy (1985). We focus our analysis of 
options on the market value of options granted because of the high cost of collecting 
information on the CEOs entire portfolio of options. 6 When determining CEO stock 
holdings, we include shares held in trust for children, shares held by immediate fam-
ily members, restricted stock, stock savings plans, and dual-class common stock and 
thereby exclude exercisable options. 
Given our focus is on the incentive components of the executive compensation 
package, we focus our analysis on changes in stockholdings in an attempt to cap-
ture the value of restricted stock grants. We assume that stock held prior to a particu-
lar year represents accumulated wealth, not current compensation. While total stock-
holdings certainly provide an incentive to CEOs, only the addition to stockholdings 
represents stock compensation for a particular year. We do, however, attempt to ad-
dress this concern by controlling for total stockholdings held by the incoming CEO 
in our regression analysis. To proxy restricted stock grants, we look at additions to 
5 For comparison, Huson et al. (2001) define 20% of their CEO turnovers as forced departures over 
the sample period 1983–1994. Denis and Denis (1995) classify between 18% and 21% of top execu-
tive changes as forced depending on the data restrictions applied. 
6 Our approach is similar to Gaver and Gaver (1995) and Collins et al. (1995). 
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the number of shares held by a CEO. 7 For turnovers where the replacement CEO 
is an insider, the increase in the number of shares is calculated by averaging the an-
nual increases in stockholdings in the 2 years following the turnover. The increase in 
the number of shares for turnovers where the replacement CEO is an outsider is cal-
culated in a similar manner, but also includes initial stockholdings in the year of the 
turnover in the calculation, as these stockholdings are likely to be in the form of new 
restricted grants. To separate the impact of share price from share grants, we hold the 
stock price constant by valuing the increase in the number of shares at the stock price 
as of the year prior to the turnover year for our restricted stock grant measure. 8 
Our analysis focuses on percentages of compensation since percentages better cap-
ture the composition of the pay package. The percentage of compensation also effec-
tively controls for systematic differences in the level of pay due to differences in firm 
size. Therefore, we require a calculation of total compensation which is simply the 
sum of the salary and bonus, value of options granted, and the value of new stock 
grants. All remaining firm level data is obtained from Compustat or CRSP. 
3   Compensation changes following CEO turnover 
3.1   Changes in CEO compensation around turnover 
Tables 1–3 provide percentages of various components of compensation surround-
ing turnover for the outgoing and incoming CEO (years −1 and +1). We ignore the 
transition year. The transition year compensation data may include partial year sala-
ries for incoming CEOs or salaries for the individual when they held a post other than 
CEO. In comparing the mean and median compensation data, Tables 1–3 indicate that 
the compensation data are skewed. The discussion and statistical tests will, therefore, 
focus on medians.
3.1.1   Structural changes for the overall sample 
In Table 1, we report comparisons of changes in compensation structure around 
CEO turnover. In Table 1, we document that incoming CEOs receive significantly 
larger median stock grants (16.7%) than the outgoing CEO (3.2%) and significantly 
higher option grants (15.7%) than the outgoing CEO (7.4%). As a result, total incen-
tives are a significantly higher percentage of total compensation (and salary and bo-
nus a significantly lower percentage) for the incoming CEO relative to the outgoing 
CEO. Thus, the composition of the pay package changes following CEO turnover, 
with incoming CEOs receiving a significantly higher percentage of compensation in 
the form of new stock grants and option grants. 9 
7 We estimate restricted grants by analyzing changes in the number of shares held during a given 
time period. If the number of shares held by a CEO decreased during the fiscal year, stock grants 
were assumed to be zero for that year. 
8 We do not use number of shares granted in our analysis since our focus is on percentages of total 
compensation which requires us to value the individual compensation components. 
9 We also analyzed changes in compensation structure using total CEO stockholdings in place of our 
proxy for the value of restricted stock grants. Total CEO stockholdings are significantly higher for 
the outgoing CEO relative to the incoming CEO. Option grants remain significantly greater for the 
incoming CEO relative to the outgoing CEO but total incentives become significantly lower for the 
incoming CEO relative to the outgoing CEO. These results are likely driven by the difference in firm 
tenure between the incoming and outgoing CEO. The incoming CEO has an average firm tenure of 
20.8 years (median is 23). The average firm tenure for the outgoing CEO is 29.7 years (median is 33). 
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3.1.2   Structural changes in compensation after voluntary and forced CEO turnover 
Table 2 shows compensation structure data for forced and voluntary turnovers in 
our sample. Median salary and bonus as a percentage of total compensation is signif-
icantly lower for the incoming CEO relative to the outgoing CEO in both the volun-
tary and forced turnover samples. Consistent with the full sample results, new stock 
grants is significantly higher for replacement CEOs in both the voluntary and forced 
samples. New stock grants as a percentage of total compensation rise more dramati-
cally following forced turnover than voluntary turnover. 
In the voluntary turnover sample, the percentage of compensation from option 
grants for the incoming CEOs is significantly greater than that of the outgoing CEOs. 
The percentage of compensation from option grants is higher for the incoming CEOs 
compared to the outgoing CEOs in the forced turnover sample, but the difference is 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: comparison of changes in compensation structure around 
CEO turnovers 
                                             Percentages of total compensation
                                    Mean         Median        Maximum       Minimum         SD          Equality of medians 
                                      (%)               (%)                (%)                   (%)               (%)            test statistica 
Salary and bonus
  Outgoing 70.54 74.78 100.00 6.62 25.63 4.8852 (0.000)**
  Incoming 54.64 54.35 100.00 4.08 23.86 
New stock grants
  Outgoing 17.04 3.19 93.38 0.00 24.32 4.7043 (0.000)**
  Incoming 25.80 16.65 95.92 0.00 24.28 
Option grants
  Outgoing 12.42 7.36 55.31 0.00 15.05 3.5253 (0.000)**
  Incoming 19.56 15.69 87.72 0.00 18.18 
Total incentives
  Outgoing 29.46 25.22 93.38 0.00 25.63 4.8852 (0.000)**
  Incoming 45.36 45.65 95.92 0.00 23.86 
Descriptive statistics are for a sample of 121 CEO turnovers occurring between 1982 and 1990. 
Compensation for the outgoing CEO is measured as of the fiscal year prior to the turnover year. 
Compensation for the incoming CEO is measured as of the fiscal year following the turnover year. 
All compensation components are adjusted for inflation and are reported in 1986 dollars. The value 
of new stock grant compensation for insiders is the average annual increase in stockholdings for 
the incoming CEO (calculated using the the 2 years following the turnover and valued at the stock 
price as of the year prior to the turnover). The value of new stock grant compensation for outsiders is 
calculated in a similar manner, but includes intial stockholdings in the year of the turnover. Option 
values are the Black-Scholes values of options granted during the fiscal year, calculated under 
a set of assumptions similar to Murphy (1985). Total incentive compensation is the sum of CEO 
stockholdings (as calculated above) and CEO option grants. Total compensation is the sum of salary 
and bonus, CEO stockholdings and CEO option grants. 
aThe Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney (non-parametric) test is used to test the equality of the compensation 
component medians at t =  −1 (the year prior to the CEO turnover) and t =  +1 (the year following 
the CEO turnover). Tests on the equality of the means of the compensation components were also 
conducted, with similar results. The number in parenthesis is the p-value associated with that test 
statistic. 
** Significant at the 5% level
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics: comparison of changes in compensation structure for forced 
versus voluntary turnovers 
                                   Mean         Median        Maximum       Minimum        SD           Equality of medians  
                                     (%)               (%)                 (%)                   (%)               (%)           test statistica 
Panel A: Percentages of total compensation for voluntary turnovers 
Salary and bonus
  Outgoing 69.07 74.32 100.00 6.62 26.80 3.7082 (0.000)**
  Incoming 55.39 57.05 100.00 4.08 22.79 
New stock grants
  Outgoing 18.93 4.25 93.38 0.00 25.39 3.4438 (0.001)**
  Incoming 24.62 16.66 95.92 0.00 23.49 
Option grants
  Outgoing 12.00 6.72 55.31 0.00 15.18 3.7026 (0.000)**
  Incoming 19.99 15.86 66.87 0.00 17.24 
Total incentives
  Outgoing 30.93 25.68 93.38 0.00 26.80 3.7082 (0.000)**
  Incoming 44.61 42.95 95.92 0.00 22.79 
Panel B: Percentages of total compensation for forced turnovers 
Salary and bonus
  Outgoing 75.19 76.07 100.00 6.73 21.26 3.2347 (0.001)**
  Incoming 52.26 52.00 100.00 6.33 27.28 
New stock grants
  Outgoing 11.07 1.07 93.27 0.00 19.75 3.4057 (0.001)**
  Incoming 29.54 16.05 91.80 0.00 26.74 
Option grants
  Outgoing 13.73 9.98 43.57 0.00 14.80 0.7620 (0.446)
  Incoming 18.20 14.39 87.72 0.00 21.18 
Total incentives
  Outgoing 24.81 23.93 93.27 0.00 21.26 3.2347 (0.001)**
  Incoming 47.74 48.00 93.67 0.00 27.28 
Descriptive statistics are for a sample of 92 voluntary and 29 forced CEO turnovers occurring between 
1982 and 1990. In 76 of the 92 voluntary turnovers, the outgoing CEO was over 60. In 13 of the 
voluntary turnovers, the incoming CEO was over 60. In 13 of the 29 forced turnovers, the outgoing 
CEO’s were over age 60. Two of the incoming CEO’s were over 60 in the forced turnover sample. 
Compensation for the outgoing CEO is measured as of the fiscal year prior to the turnover year. 
Compensation for the incoming CEO is measured as of the fiscal year following the turnover year. 
All compensation components are adjusted for inflation and are reported in 1986 dollars. The value 
of new stock grant compensation for insiders is the average annual increase in stockholdings for the 
incoming CEO (calculated using the 2 years following the turnover and valued at the stock price 
as of the year prior to the turnover). The value of new stock grant compensation for outsiders is 
calcuated in a similar manner, but includes initial stockholdings in the year of the turnover. Option 
values are the Black-Scholes values of options granted during the fiscal year, calcuated under a set of 
assumptions similar to Murphy (1985). Total incentive compensation is the sum of CEO stockholdings 
and CEO option grants. Total compensation is the sum of salary and bonus, CEO stockholdings and 
CEO option grants. 
a The Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney (non-parametric) test is ued to test the equality of the compensation 
component medians at t =  −1 (the year prior to the CEO turnover) and t =  +1 (the year following 
the CEO turnover). Tests on the equality of the means of the compensation components were also 
conducted, with similar results. The number in parenthesis is the p-value associated with that test 
statistic. 
** Significant at the 5% level
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not significant. Overall, the median percentage of compensation received in the form 
of new stock and option grants is very similar for the incoming CEOs independent of 
whether the CEO follows a forced or voluntary turnover. 
Total incentives as a percentage of total compensation are significantly higher for 
incoming CEOs relative to the outgoing CEOs in both the voluntary and forced sam-
ples. In the forced sample, median total incentives as a percentage of total compen-
sation appear to rise more dramatically for the incoming CEO (48%) relative to the 
outgoing CEO (23.9%) than in the voluntary sample (where the comparable percent-
ages are 43 and 25.7). Therefore, as noted for the full sample, the structure of equity-
based compensation appears to change around CEO turnover, where incoming CEOs 
are loaded up with incentive compensation independent of the type of turnover. 10 
Changes in the percentage of incentive compensation are more pronounced following 
forced turnovers. 
An alternative approach to analyzing the compensation structure is to partition 
the turnover sample based on inside versus outside replacement. One hundred and 
fifteen of the turnovers result in inside replacement and ninety four of these turn-
overs are voluntary turnovers. Not surprisingly, the descriptive statistics for insiders 
tend to mimic the full sample and are very similar to the voluntary turnover sample. 
In the outside replacement sample, the descriptive statistics for the incoming and out-
going CEO are not significantly different from each other. However, the outside re-
placement sample has only 10 observations (one voluntary and nine forced), so the 
small sample size of outside replacements makes it difficult to draw meaningful in-
ferences regarding compensation structure changes around turnover for outside CEO 
replacements. 
3.1.3   Structural changes in compensation controlling for CEO age around turnover 
One potential criticism of our analysis is that an incoming CEO is likely to be of a 
different age than the outgoing CEO. The structure of compensation is likely to dif-
fer for CEOs of different ages due to the horizon problem. The horizon problem hy-
pothesis predicts that CEOs nearing retirement will forgo valuable capital investment 
expenditures because incentive plans based on accounting data will penalize current 
CEOs and reward only their successors. A means to overcome the horizon problem 
is to use more stock-based compensation for older CEOs to provide long-term incen-
tives. If outgoing CEOs are older and have optimal compensation plans, we expect to 
observe a decrease in equity-based compensation for the incoming CEO. 
We compare compensation structure between incoming and outgoing CEOs who 
are close in age. We rank the turnovers based on the absolute value of the difference 
in age between the outgoing and incoming CEO. We then divide the sample into 
quartiles based on the age difference. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the sam-
ple of turnovers in the lowest quartile (i.e. the quartile containing turnovers with the 
10 We also analyzed changes in compensation structure for forced and voluntary turnover using total 
CEO stockholdings in place of our proxy for the value of restricted stock grants. The results for each 
subsample are very similar to the full sample results discussed in footnote 9. Note also that 9 of the 
30 forced turnovers resulted in an outside replacement, while only 1 of the 95 voluntary turnovers re-
sulted in an outside replacement which will likely impact total stockholdings due to shorter firm ten-
ures for outside replacements. The average firm tenure for the incoming CEO is 22.8 years in the vol-
untary departure sample and 14.3 years in the forced departure sample. The average firm tenure for 
the outgoing CEO is 31.4 years (voluntary sample) and 24.2 years (forced sample). 
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smallest age difference). This quartile includes turnovers where the incoming CEO is 
within 5 years of age of the outgoing CEO. Within the age-based sample, the outgo-
ing CEO is 1.94 years older than the incoming CEO, on average, and 24 of the 32 turn-
overs were voluntary. In addition, 29 outgoing CEOs were replaced by inside CEOs 
while three outgoing CEOs were replaced by outside CEOs. Consistent with the full 
sample results, new stock grants and option grants increase significantly and salary 
and bonus decrease significantly between incoming and outgoing CEOs as shown in 
Table 3. Therefore, changes in compensation structure in the overall sample are not 
attributable to horizon problems as these changes persist even when we control for 
differences in age between the incoming and outgoing CEO. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: comparison of changes in compensation structure around 
CEO turnovers 
                                                   Percentages of total compensation
                                    Mean        Median         Maximum     Minimum         SD        Equality of medians  
                                      (%)              (%)                  (%)                  (%)               (%)              test statistica 
Salary and bonus
  Outgoing 68.42 73.10 100.00 6.62 27.51 2.5444 (0.011)**
  Incoming 53.39 51.85 100.00 20.97 20.30 
New stock grants
  Outgoing 19.33 6.87 93.38 0.00 25.92 1.9134 (0.056)*
  Incoming 26.99 23.24 75.55 0.00 21.57 
Option grants
  Outgoing 12.24 7.65 55.31 0.00 14.59 2.0745 (0.038)**
  Incoming 19.62 17.90 54.44 0.00 15.83 
Total incentives
  Outgoing 31.58 26.90 93.38 0.00 27.51 2.5444 (0.011)**
  Incoming 46.61 48.15 79.03 0.00 20.30 
Sample controlled for age—includes only turnovers where age difference between incoming and 
outgoing CEO is 5 years or less
This sample was derived by ranking all turnovers by the age difference between the outgoing and 
incoming CEO. The total turnover sample was then divided into quartiles based upon the age 
difference ranking. Descriptive statistics are for the 32 turnovers in the lowest quartile (i.e. the 
quartile containing turnovers with the smallest age difference). Of these 32 turnovers, 9 were forced 
turnovers and 23 were voluntary. Compensation for the outgoing CEO is measured as of the fiscal 
year prior to the turnover year. Compensation for the incoming CEO is measured as of the fiscal 
year following the turnover year. All compensation components are adjusted for inflation and are 
reported in 1986 dollars. The value of new stock grant compensation is the average annual increase 
in stockholdings for the incoming CEO (calculated using the the 2 years following the turnover 
and valued at the stock price as of the year prior to the turnover). The value of new stock grant 
compensation for outsiders is calculated in a similar manner, but includes intial stockholdings in the 
year of the turnover. Option values are the Black-Scholes values of options granted during the fiscal 
year, calculated under a set of assumptions similar to Murphy (1985). Total incentive compensation 
is the sum of CEO stockholdings and CEO option grants. Total compensation is the sum of salary and 
bonus, CEO stockholdings (as calculated above) and CEO option grants. 
a The Wilcoxon/Mann–Whitney (non-parametric) test is used to test the equality of the compensation 
component medians at t =  −1 (the year prior to the CEO turnover) and t =  +1 (the year following 
the CEO turnover). Tests on the equality of the means of the compensation components were also 
conducted, with similar results. The number in parenthesis is the p-value associated with that test 
statistic. 
* Significant at the 10% level
** Significant at the 5% level
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3.2   Summary of changes in CEO compensation around turnover 
We find that the salary and bonus as a percentage of compensation of the incom-
ing CEO is significantly lower than the outgoing CEO for the full sample of turnovers 
and for both turnover subsamples. Compared to pre-turnover levels, new stock grants 
and the value of options granted increase significantly for the full sample and follow-
ing voluntary and forced departure. Our results do not change when we control for 
age differences between the incoming and outgoing CEO. The composition of incen-
tives from options and new stock grants changes after turnover. 
4   Relating compensation structure and firm performance 
4.1   Method 
Given the change in compensation structure following CEO turnover discussed 
in the previous section, we now investigate whether there is an association between 
the structural change in compensation and future firm performance. Our approach 
is to first analyze the relation between compensation structure of the incoming CEO 
in year one (+1) and future firm performance in years two (+2) and three (+3). We 
also analyze changes in the compensation of the incoming CEO relative to the out-
going CEO and measure the associated changes in firm performance pre- and post-
turnover. Given previous research, our analysis of the relation between the compen-
sation package and future performance holds constant firm size, total stockholdings 
of the incoming CEO, firm leverage, firm growth opportunities, and business risk. 11 
We also control for the type of turnover that preceded the structural change in com-
pensation and the age of the incoming CEO. Our research design is similar to that of 
Mehran (1995). 
The initial regression model is as follows: 
Firm performance following
       CEO turnover   =  f   (percentage of restricted stock compensation, percentage              
 of option compensation, and control variables)                         (1)
Next, we focus on the change in equity-based compensation between the incom-
ing CEO and the outgoing CEO. Equation 2 (below) specifies the relation between 
firm performance changes around turnover as a function of changes in the structure 
of incentive compensation of the incoming CEO relative to the outgoing CEO. In both 
specifications, we omit the percentage of fixed compensation to avoid a singular ma-
trix of independent variables. 
Change in firm performance 
    surrounding CEO turnover =  f   (change in percentage of restricted stock 
                                                                compensation, change in percentage of 
option compensation, and control variables)             (2)
11 See Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Mehran (1995), and Yermack (1995) among 
others. 
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4.2   Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is specified using both accounting and market-based 
measures of performance. Accounting measures of performance provide informa-
tion to the board regarding the performance of the CEO. Hermalin and Weisbach’s 
(1998) model of endogenously chosen boards of directors predicts that accounting 
measures of performance are better predictors of management turnover than stock-
price performance. The implication is that accounting measures capture the perfor-
mance of current management. Therefore, we expect CEOs with more incentive com-
patible compensation packages to produce better accounting measures of future firm 
performance. 
We examine two measures of firm performance. Following Denis and Denis (1995), 
we use operating income before depreciation, defined as sales minus cost of goods 
sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses and scaled by total assets. 12 
Following Mehran (1995), we use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for a market-based measure of 
firm performance. We construct the proxy using the Chung and Pruitt (1994) method. 
Under this method, the approximate Tobin’s Q is calculated by adding the firm’s mar-
ket value of equity, the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, the 
value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets, and the book value 
of the firm’s long-term debt. This sum is then divided by the book value of the firm’s 
assets. 13 We calculate firm performance measures two (+2) and three (+3) years from 
the turnover year (year 0). 14 
We industry adjust the performance measures by subtracting the median of firms 
in the same 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). Typically, industry-ad-
justed performance measures are used to capture relative performance evaluation in 
either compensation contracts or the threat of turnover. Since our analysis focuses on 
the association between compensation structure and future performance, it is not ob-
vious that relative performance is the theoretically appropriate metric. Therefore, fol-
lowing Denis and Denis (1995), we initially present regression results for unadjusted 
and industry-adjusted performance measures and then continue with industry-ad-
justed performance measures. Our results are qualitatively the same using unadjusted 
measures of performance unless otherwise noted in the paper. 
A potential problem associated with market-based measures of future firm perfor-
mance for our purposes is that to the extent that compensation structure changes are 
expected to result in improved performance; the market-based measure should cap-
12 Using this performance measure eliminates the typical type of ‘big bath,’ which may affect account-
ing measures of performance that rely on net income. Most ‘baths’ involve write offs that impact 
net income but not operating income. As a robustness check, we also measure accounting perfor-
mance using return on assets (ROA) measured as net income divided by total assets (e.g., Black-
well et al. 1994; Mehran 1995). The ROA results are qualitatively the same as the operating income 
results unless otherwise noted. All of the ROA results are available from the authors. 
13 We use this method because the Manufacturing Sector Master File data used to compute the tradi-
tional Tobin’s Q is available only through 1987. Chung and Pruitt (1994) found no significant differ-
ences between the Tobin’s Q calculated using the traditional and the approximation methods. Barn-
hart and Rosenstein (1998) also used the Chung and Pruitt method for approximating Tobin’s Q. 
14 Allgood and Farrell (2000) document that approximately 26% of CEOs turn over within the first 
3 years of CEO tenure. Since we control for the same CEO remaining in office 3 years after turn-
over, we do not extend our performance analysis beyond 3 years since we would lose additional 
sample firms. 
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ture this effect contemporaneously. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) con-
tend that stock returns reflect both the performance of current management and the 
expectation of future performance, conditional on management changes. One could 
argue that stock returns also reflect the expected benefits from incentive effects of 
compensation contracts. Alternatively, Hermalin and Weisbach contend that account-
ing earnings are a function of the performance of current management only (and pos-
sibly that of CEOs in prior years). Given the backward-looking nature of an account-
ing measure of performance, it may take a year or two before accounting measures 
reflect the decisions of the incoming CEO. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and all of the 
control variables used in our regression analysis.
4.3   Independent variables 
The independent variables in our analysis measure compensation structure. We 
focus on equity-based compensation in the model specifications. We define two vari-
ables, the proportion of stock options as a percentage of total pay and the proportion 
of new stock grants as a percentage of pay (salary and bonus as a percentage of total 
pay is the excluded variable). We calculate these variables for the incoming CEO in 
the first full year following turnover. The descriptive statistics for these variables are 
contained in Tables 1 and 2, for the full sample and the forced and voluntary subsam-
ples, respectively. We also calculate the change in the proportion of stock options and 
new stock grants for the incoming CEO relative to the outgoing CEO. 
4.4   Control variables 
One of the most well documented empirical regularities in the executive compen-
sation literature is the positive relation between executive compensation and firm size 
(e.g., Murphy 1985; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Chung and Pruitt 1996). We include to-
tal assets to account for differences in firm size and we specify our variable as the 
natural logarithm of total assets, consistent with Murphy (1995), Yermack (1995), and 
Mehran (1995), among others. 
A CEO’s total stockholdings likely provide incentives to influence future firm per-
formance. Given our focus is on the incentives provided by the current compensation 
package, we attempt to control for the effect of a CEO’s initial stockholdings. The in-
coming CEO’s total stockholdings value is computed using the number of shares held 
and the stock price per share as of the end of the fiscal year following the turnover year. 
Many studies have found a positive association between stock options and growth 
opportunities (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993; Mehran 1995). Al-
ternatively, Yermack (1995) and Bizjack et al. (1993) find a negative relation between 
stock-based incentives and growth opportunities. One complicating factor is that some 
studies proxy for growth opportunities using Tobin’s Q (as used in Smith and Watts 
1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993; Yermack, 1995). Mehran (1995), however, uses R&D to 
sales. We do not use Tobin’s Q to measure growth options since it is our proxy for 
firm performance. We do not use R&D to sales because of missing data. Therefore, we 
specify a proxy that captures the value of the firm’s assets in place as an alternative 
to measuring growth options. Consistent with Mehran (1995), we measure assets in 
place as the ratio of inventory plus gross plant and equipment to total assets. Mehran 
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documents a negative relation between Tobin’s Q and assets in place but a positive re-
lation between ROA and assets in place, although neither relation is significant. 
Yermack (1995) hypothesizes that incentives provided by stock option awards 
will decrease as financial leverage increases due to the increased agency costs of debt. 
However, he finds no significant relation between financial leverage and incentives 
from stock option awards. Mehran (1995) finds no relation between financial leverage 
and the percentage of equity-based compensation. Lewellen et al. (1987), however, 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for regression variables 
                                                                   Mean    Median   Maximum  Minimum      SD       Observations
Dependent variables 
Unadjusted performance measures
  OIBDA 2 years after turnover 0.1597 0.1560 0.4470 0.0120 0.0732 120
  OIBDA 3 years after turnover 0.1575 0.1510 0.5640 −0.0250 0.0789 117
  Tobin’s Q 2 years after turnover 1.0393 0.7880 6.7360 0.2450 0.8816 109
  Tobin’s Q 3 years after turnover 1.0743 0.8590 6.7010 −0.2530 0.8882 107
Adjusted performance measures
  OIBDA 2 years after turnover 0.0527 0.0418 0.3270 −0.1080 0.0734 120
  OIBDA 3 years after turnover 0.0501 0.0390 0.4510 −0.0780 0.0767 117
  Tobin’s Q 2 years after turnover 0.2266 0.0330 5.9040 −1.2200 0.8257 109
  Tobin’s Q 3 years after turnover 0.2271 0.0645 5.9005 −1.1420 0.8462 107
Independent variables 
  Total stockholdings (in millions) 2.8082 0.8984 82.8252 0.0000 8.3439 121
  Assets-in-place 0.8639 0.8285 1.9370 0.0940 0.3263 118
  LT debt/assets 0.1788 0.1665 0.4990 0.0000 0.1142 118
  Ln(assets) 7.9391 7.8735 11.2250 5.3190 1.2450 118
  Standard deviation of OIBDA 0.5162 0.1585 10.7920 0.0240 1.3315 117
  Incoming CEO age 0.1240 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3309 121
  Forced turnover 0.2397 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4287 121
OIBDA = Operating income before depreciation and amortization, for the second and third fiscal years 
following the turnover, respectively. 
Tobin’s Q = [market value of equity + liquidating value of outstanding preferred stock + book value of 
short-term liabilities net of short-term assets + book value of long-term debt]/book value of assets, 
calculated for the second and third years following the turnover 
Industry-adjusted performance measures were computed by subtracting the median performance measure 
for the industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes) from the performance measure for the turnover firm 
Total stockholdings = Value of total stockholdings, calculated as the number of shares times the stock 
price, both in the year following the turnover 
Assets-in-place = (Inventory + gross property, plant and equipment)/total assets, calculated for the 
year following the turnover
LT debt/assets = Long-term debt/total assets, calculated for the year following the turnover
Ln(assets) = Natural log of total assets, calculated for the year following the turnover
Standard deviation of OIBDA = Standard deviation of unadjusted operating income before depreciation 
and amortization, calculated over the 5-year period beginning 1 year prior to the turnover and ending 
3 years following the turnover 
Incoming CEO age = Dummy variable equal to 1 if the incoming CEO is over age 60, 0 otherwise
Forced turnover = Dummy variable equal to 1 if outgoing CEO departure was forced; 0 if outgoing 
CEO departure was voluntary
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find a positive relation between stock related compensation and leverage. To control 
for potential agency costs of debt, we specify the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
as a proxy for leverage following Mehran (1995). 
Business risk may also impact the structure of the compensation package and ex-
pected firm performance. For example, Lewellen et al. (1987) find a positive relation 
between stock related compensation and the monthly stock return variance. They ar-
gue, however, that the predicted relation is an empirical question. Similar to Mehran 
(1995), we measure business risk as the standard deviation of the percentage change 
in operating income measured with annual data from 1 year prior to turnover to 
3 years after. 15 
Despite the results shown in Table 3 that indicate compensation structure changes 
after turnover are independent of the age of the incoming and outgoing CEO, we con-
trol for CEO age in the regressions to account for the horizon problem of the incom-
ing CEO. We specify the age variable as an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s 
incoming CEO is older than 60 years of age. We use an indicator variable since we do 
not expect the relation to be necessarily linearly related to age. 16 
Our final control variable relates to the type of turnover. Specifically, we control 
for whether the incoming CEO entered office following a forced turnover. Denis and 
Denis (1995) find that industry-adjusted operating income increases significantly in 
the years following CEO replacement but these performance changes vary depend-
ing on whether the turnover is forced or voluntary. The firms that force turnover are 
characterized by large, statistically significant decreases in operating income prior to 
the CEO change, and significant improvement after. In the subsample of normal re-
tirements they do not observe significant performance declines before turnover, but 
they do document a small post-turnover improvement in performance. 17 In addition, 
forced turnovers are characterized by slightly different structural changes in compen-
sation. Therefore, we control for forced turnover by specifying an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm experienced a forced turnover in the transition year, and zero 
otherwise. As an alternative method of capturing differences between forced and vol-
untary turnovers, we partition the sample between forced and voluntary turnover 
and estimate our regressions separately for each subsample. 
4.5   Results 
Table 5 shows our estimates of Equation 1. The specification in Table 5, columns 1 
through 4 shows the regression results using operating income and Tobin’s Q as the 
firm performance measures, unadjusted for industry performance. The specification in 
columns 5 through 8 includes the industry-adjusted performance variables. In general, 
Table 5 shows that the percentage of new stock grants in year +1 for the incoming CEO 
is positively related to firm performance in years +2 and +3, regardless of the perfor-
15 Mehran (1995) measures the standard deviation over a 10-year horizon. However, for the early 
turnovers in the sample, we do not have sufficient Compustat data to capture a 10-year horizon. 
16 Our approach is similar to Parrino (1997) who argues that the likelihood of voluntary turnover ap-
pears to increase once a CEO reaches the age of 60, but does not increase linearly beyond the age 
of 60. We argue that the horizon problem is likely to become relevant as a CEO approaches retire-
ment and would seem to increase once a CEO reaches the age of 60. 
17 Also using operating income as the proxy for performance, Huson et al. (2004) find that perfor-
mance improvements after CEO turnover tend to be in those firms that hire the incoming CEO 
from outside the firm. 
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mance measure. In results not shown using return on assets as the firm performance 
measure, the results for new stock grants are qualitatively the same. We also find a posi-
tive relation between the percentage of stock options and return on assets in year +3.
Although the coefficient on the forced turnover indicator variable is not significantly 
different from zero in any of the model specifications shown in Table 5, we estimate 
Equation 1 separately for the forced and voluntary subsamples (see Table 6). It appears 
that the positive relation between the percentage of compensation derived from new 
stock grants and industry-adjusted operating income in the full sample (Table 5) per-
sists for both subsamples of turnovers (see Table 6). The positive and significant rela-
tion between the percentage of compensation derived from new stock grants and in-
dustry adjusted Tobin’s Q documented in Table 5 only persists for the forced turnover 
sample as shown in Table 6. We also document a positive relation between percentage 
of compensation derived from option grants and industry-adjusted operating income in 
year +3 and for results not shown, for ROA in year +3 in the forced turnover sample. 18 
In Table 6, we also report a negative relation between total stockholdings of the in-
coming CEO and future firm performance following forced turnover. Upon further 
analysis, this result appears to be driven by outside replacements. As noted by De-
nis and Denis (1995), firms tend to improve operating income following forced turn-
over. Also, incoming CEOs that are appointed from outside the firm, have on aver-
age, lower total stockholdings relative to inside replacements. 
4.6   Changes in CEO compensation and performance 
To determine the compensation changes associated with the improvements in firm 
performance, we regress changes in firm performance (calculated as the average 2-year 
performance of the incoming CEO relative to the performance of the outgoing CEO in 
the last full year in office) on changes in the incoming CEOs compensation package rel-
ative to the outgoing CEO. To calculate the changes in compensation we determine 
the total value of the outgoing and incoming CEOs compensation as the sum of salary 
and bonus, the Black-Scholes value of options granted, and the increase in the value of 
stockholdings (our proxy for restricted stock grants). Then we calculate the percentage 
of each of these components using total compensation as the denominator. Finally, we 
calculate the change in these percentages by subtracting the outgoing CEO compensa-
tion percentage from the incoming CEO compensation percentage. 
As shown in Table 7, for the full sample we find that a change in new stock grants 
is positively related to changes in both industry and non-industry adjusted operating 
income. Since the type of turnover may impact the change in performance, we parti-
tion the data between forced and voluntary turnover and find that the voluntary turn-
over sample more closely mimics the full sample, exhibiting a significant positive re-
lation between new stock grants and changes in operating performance independent 
of whether performance is industry-adjusted or unadjusted. The coefficient on the 
change in new stock grants variable is not significant in the forced turnover sample. 
18 If we partition the sample between inside and outside replacements, the inside replacement results 
more closely mimic those of the full sample as reported in Table 5. The outside replacement re-
sults are more difficult to interpret given the small sample sizes. The positive relation between new 
stock grants and future firm performance tends to be more similar to the forced turnover results re-
ported in Table 6. The only notable difference is size of the coefficients and that a positive relation 
between new stock grants and ROA in year +2 is not significant in the outside replacement sample. 
We also find a negative relation between option grants and future firm performance. 
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This result holds for ROA as an alternative proxy for accounting performance. We 
also partition the data between inside and outside replacements. Similarly, we find a 
significant positive relation between new stock grants and changes in operating per-
formance and ROA independent of whether performance is industry-adjusted or un-
adjusted for the sample of inside replacements. Our sample size for outside replace-
ments is too small to perform a similar regression.
Taken together, these results suggest that performance improvements as mea-
sured using accounting data following CEO turnover are associated with greater CEO 
stock grants especially following voluntary turnover. This result appears consistent 
with Core and Larcker (2002) who find that for a sample of firms that are required to 
increase the level of managerial equity ownership due to the adoption of ‘target own-
ership plans’ experience improvements in firm performance. 
5   Summary and conclusions 
We study changes in CEO compensation surrounding CEO turnover to determine 
whether changes in compensation structure are associated with future performance. 
Incoming CEOs following forced and voluntary turnover have significantly higher 
new stock and option grants as a percent of total compensation than their predeces-
sors. We also document a positive relation between the percentage of compensation 
in the form of new stock grants for the incoming CEO and future firm performance. 
Finally, we find that increases in new stock grants for the incoming CEO relative to 
the outgoing CEO are associated with increases in operating income after turnover. 
The overall implication is that although incoming CEOs have been loaded up with 
options (as noted by Hall and Liebman (1998) who show that option compensation 
has increased monotonically since the early 1980s), from an incentive compatibility 
perspective, stock grants appear more strongly associated with future firm perfor-
mance (post-turnover performance improvement). Greater stock grants appear to pro-
vide “greater” incentives to CEOs to improve future performance than option grants. 
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